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a b s t r a c t
Ethnographic populations throughout Western North America relied on strategies and institutions to
protect resources for exclusive use, though the degree of territorial defense varied signiﬁcantly across the
region. Attempts to explain this variation typically focus on the ecological contexts that promote economic defensibility, however, it is increasingly recognized that social dynamics also play a critical role
because territoriality requires within group coordination or cooperation. Building on ideal distribution
models, here we present a hypothesis for territorial defense that links ecological, economic, and social
factors through Allee's principle: positive covariance between utility and the number of cohabiting individuals up to intermediate population densities. We predict that when foragers experience an Alleelike economy of scale, individual interests are more likely to align and facilitate within group cooperation and the exclusion of out-group competitors. We evaluate this model using data on 157 foraging
populations from contact-era Western North America. The results support our predictions, showing that
larger cooperative groups have greater levels of territorial behavior, speciﬁcally higher levels of resource
ownership and intergroup violence. Thus, incorporating Allee's principles may help to explain how
territorial behaviors can emerge, driven by the individual beneﬁts gained from aggregation in ecological
contexts where economic returns to scale make in-group cooperation and out-group exclusion
worthwhile.

1. Introduction
Territorial defense is costly. It may require individuals to
establish and maintain institutions governing resource ownership
and property rights, and possibly to uphold those claimed resources or land with physical force. But territorial defense has
obvious beneﬁts too, including exclusive resource use and
increased food security.
Evaluating these trade-offs, ecologically minded anthropologists suggest that individuals should only engage in territorial
behavior when the beneﬁts outweigh the costs, which should occur
when critical resources are both dense and predictable (DysonHudson and Smith, 1978). However, even if these ecological conditions are met, individuals may still not ﬁnd territorial defense
worthwhile (Cashdan, 1983; Smith, 1988). One possible reason for
this centers on costs of social dilemmas (Freeman and Anderies,
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2015). Importantly, any one individual should not ﬁnd territorial
investment worthwhile until the proportion of cooperating defenders provide beneﬁts that outweigh the cost incurred by freeriders who refuse to recognize ownership or engage in defense
(Willems et al., 2015). With this in mind, we suggest that territorial
defense should only emerge when the interests of multiple individuals are aligned, which itself may be favored under particular
ecological, economic, and social circumstances.
To identify the conditions that may promote territorial behavior,
here we build on an ideal distribution model (IDM, Fretwell and
Lucas, 1969) from population ecology. IDMs are particularly useful
for explaining cooperative behavior like territoriality because they
are designed to examine the aggregate effects of individual
behavior (Sutherland, 1996). Anthropological applications of IDMs
have advanced our understanding of colonization events (e.g., Allen
and O'Connell, 2008; O'Connell and Allen, 2012; Giovas and
Fitzpatrick, 2014; Yaworsky and Codding, 2018), settlement patterns (e.g., Codding et al., 2012; Jazwa et al., 2013; Codding and
Jones, 2016), pastoral management (e.g., Moritz et al., 2013, 2014,
2015), agricultural investment (e.g., McClure et al., 2006),

marriage patterns (e.g., Borgerhoff Mulder, 1990), children's
foraging (Disma et al., 2011), linguistic mosaics (Codding and Jones,
2013), and despotic behaviors (e.g., Kennett et al., 2009;
Winterhalder et al., 2010; Bell and Winterhalder, 2014; Prufer
et al., 2017), including territoriality (Jazwa et al., 2017, this issue).
The basic model proposes that the utility of an activity (the
beneﬁts minus the costs) will vary depending on the number of
conspeciﬁcs also engaged in that activity. Used mostly to examine
subsistence, the model speciﬁes a functional relationship between
per capita utility (e.g., ﬁtness, energetic returns) and the size of the
cohabiting population (e.g., others in the same patch or habitat).
This relationship is often thought to take the form of negative
density dependence (NDD), where each additional person lowers
everyone's utility (Fig. 1 a / b). Alternatively, it may take on an
“Allee-like” form (see Allee, 1931, see also Courchamp et al., 1999;
Stephens and Sutherland, 1999; Stephens et al., 1999), where each
additional person initially has a net positive effect on everyone's
utility (Fig. 1 c / d), until some saturation point (Fig. 1 d) when the
relationship returns to negative density dependence (Fig. 1 d / e).
While many economic activities should take the NDD form,
some may produce an Allee-like functional relationship. In particular, subsistence strategies with an economy of scale can be
described as Allee-like because everyone will do better with the
addition of another individual. Forager subsistence strategies with
an economy of scale include those where coordination pays off,
such as ﬁshing with nets (Bliege Bird and Bird, 1997), hunting large
game (Smith, 1985; Alvard and Nolin, 2002), or driving game (e.g.,
Steward, 1938), and those that provide capital investments such as
managing the land with ﬁre (a form of landesque capital, see Bird
et al., 2016; Gammage, 2011, also Lewis and Ferguson, 1988;
Anderson, 2005), constructing ﬁshing dams or weirs (Beckerman,
1983; Mohlenhoff and Codding, 2017), or building game drive
lines and jumps (e.g., Frison, 2004; Hockett et al., 2013). However,
because no subsistence activity scales indeﬁnitely, eventually even

Fig. 1. Theoretical utility functions derived from the IDM (Greene and Stamps, 2001,
eq. 1) describing the relationship between population size and utility (beneﬁts minus
costs) for subsistence strategies with negative density dependence (NDD) compared to
those with an economy of scale resulting in Allee-like density dependence. Individuals
engaged in NDD subsistence strategies would maximize utility by working alone,
resulting in small cooperative groups with little common interest in engaging in territorial behavior. Individuals engaged in Allee-like subsistence strategies with an
economy of scale should beneﬁt from cohabitation, coordination, or cooperation,
resulting in larger groups with shared interests in excluding others after saturation at
the optimal group size (point d).

an activity with an economy of scale will reach the saturation point
at which everyone does worse with each additional joiner (e.g.,
Beckerman, 1983; Smith, 1985, 1991). This saturation threshold at
the optimum group sizedpoint d in Fig. 1dcreates an incentive for
individuals within a cooperative group to exclude others, whether
they are would-be joiners or potential resource poachers; the latter
having an incentive where economies of scale provide capital investments that increase resource proﬁtability. Theory from the
biological literature indicates that observed stable group sizes
should be near (Kramer, 1985) or greater than the optimum (Sibly,
1983), the former being more likely if the shape of the Allee-like
utility function begins with high per capita gains (Giraldeau and
Gillis, 1985; Giraldeau, 1988, see review by Krause and Ruxton,
2002).
Of course, even if exclusion is beneﬁcial at and after this saturation threshold, such behaviors should only be undertaken if the
additional costs of excluding others is lower than the utility lost by
allowing them to join. Whether or not this condition is met depends on at least two important factors. First, defense costs will
lower the utility of the patch or activity for both the resident and
the joiner (see Giraldeau, 1988, Fig. 3), but individuals attempting to
join may have more to gain than the defender has to loose given the
differential gains accrued by working alone (Fig. 1 c) versus working in a group (Fig. 1 d). Thus for territoriality to emerge, the costs of
exclusion must be high enough to discourage joiners, but lower
than utility lost by simply allowing one more individual to enter the
patch (Fig. 1 dþ1). Second, the per capita costs of exclusion will be
dramatically lowered if every individual within the group shares
some of the total cost of defense, but this introduces a social
dilemma: everyone beneﬁts from excluding potential joiners while
the decision to pay the cost is up to every individual, thereby
opening the door to the possibility of free-riders who gain the
beneﬁts of exclusion without paying the costs. Thus, to overcome
this dilemma, individuals who pay the costs of excluding others
must either gain differential beneﬁts, which may take the form of
increased social status or deference in decisions (Smith and Bliege
Bird, 2005; Glowacki and von Rueden, 2015), or pay lower costs due
to their innate abilities (Gilby et al., 2008), either of which may elicit
further contributions from others (McAuliffe et al., 2015), and
possibly facilitate larger groups with emergent leadership (Hooper
et al., 2010).
Given the above, subsistence strategies with Allee-like utilitypopulation dynamics may present the ecological, economic, and
social conditions that encourage territorial defense. Speciﬁcally,
creating a context when individual economic interests are aligned
to exclude others, thereby incentivizing territorial behaviordranging from institutions of ownership to acts of violence and
warfare. If this is correct, then individuals engaged in subsistence
activities with an economy of scale should respond by forming
larger cooperative groups of a size proportional to the marginal
beneﬁts gained from cooperating (see, e.g., Powers and Lehmann,
2017). In turn, these cooperative groups should eventually reach
saturation, producing incentives for individuals to refuse potential
in-group joiners and exclude out-group poachers as long as the
costs of defense do not exceed the costs of adding another group
member. This encourages territorial behaviors ranging from the
development of institutions that limit others from within and
outside the group from using claimed resources, to the deployment
of physical violence needed enforce territorial claims threatened by
out-group poachers or raiders. Thus we predict that if Allee-like
economies of scale align individual interests in production tasks,
then larger cooperative groups should have greater territorial behaviors manifested as higher levels of resource ownership and
higher frequencies of inter-group violence.
Here we use ethnographic data on Western North American

foragers compiled by Binford (2001) to evaluate the hypothesis that
cooperative group size and territorial behaviors positively covary. If
contact-era foragers in Western North America engaged in subsistence practices with an economy of scale, then they should have
experienced Allee-like relationships between resource utility and
population size. If this is true, then populations with larger cooperative groups would be encouraged to engage in increased territorial behaviors. In other words, and all else being equal, larger
cooperative groups should have greater incentives and lower costs
to refuse potential in-group joiners and exclude out-group users.
While we do not have data to examine economic utility (beneﬁts
minus costs) as a function of group size, we can evaluate how
factors associated with territorialitydsuch as resource ownership
and inter-group violencedscale with cooperative group size. If
Western North American foragers engaged in subsistence practices
with an Allee-like economy of scale, then stronger forms of territorial behavior should be associated with intermediate to large
cooperative group sizes. Based on these predictions, we ask three
questions with the available data: 1) Are larger cooperative groups
more likely to own resource locations? 2) Do larger cooperative
groups have higher levels of inter-group violence? 3) Do larger
cooperative groups have higher levels of warfare?

2. Methods
2.1. Data
To evaluate our predictions, we rely on the global forager
database compiled by Binford (2001). These data are available in
print (Binford, 2001), on the web (Johnson, 2014), or as an R library
(Marwick et al., 2016; R Core Team, 2016).
From the global forager database, we select populations from
Western North America (Fig. 2). These include all populations
designated to one of three culture areas (wc.area): Western North
America (“WNA”), Northwest Coast (“BC NWC”) or Southwest
(“SW”), totaling 157 forager societies.
Binford (2001) ﬂagged cases thought to be “suspect”, indicating
that they may have relied on some domesticated resources or had
economies “based primarily on mutualistic articulations with nonhunting and gathering peoples” (Binford, 2001, p. 117). However,
we do not exclude the six suspect populations in this sample in
order to maintain the full range of variation described ethnohistorically, which may itself be a greater range of variation than
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Fig. 2. Map of Western North American foragers represented in the Binford (2001)
database color coded by the primary source of food (aquatic resources, gathered
terrestrial plants, or hunted terrestrial animals). (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

what existed prehistorically. We suggest that maintaining these
populations in the sample more realistically represents the population dynamics that existed during this period of time, which
represents post-contact equilibrium. Similarly, we include 24
populations described as “horse mounted hunters” (Binford, 2001,
Table 7.06) so to reﬂect the diversity of adaptations represented
across Western North America. However, to be sure that these latter
cases are not primarily responsible for driving any of the results, we
also evaluate each prediction for each major subsistence focus
(more below).
For our purposes, two variables on group size are relevant
(Binford, 2001, Table 8.01). The ﬁrst (group1) is an estimate of the
smallest self-sufﬁcient group that regularly cooperates for subsistence during the most dispersed time of the year, here referred to as
the minimum cooperative group size. Bettinger (2015) refers to this
as the “microband”. The second (group2) is an estimate of the
average consumer group size during the most aggregated time of
year, here referred to as the aggregated cooperative group size. The
former (group1) can be thought of as the smallest possible cooperative group required for subsistence, while the latter (group2) can
be thought of as the near largest cooperative group (Binford, 2001).
Depending on variation in seasonal economic behaviors, the
aggregated cooperative group may represent cooperative group
size for nearly all of the year (for example, among sedentary populations along the Northwest Coast), or may represent aggregation
events that are few and far between (for example, during rabbit
drives in the Great Basin). The Western North American sample
includes minimum cooperative group size estimates for 77 populations, and aggregated cooperative group size estimates for 138
populations. Here we assume that the group size values for each
population represent the optimal outcome based on the local
ecological and economic condition, essentially treating cooperative
group size as a proxy for the Allee-like economy of scale present in
the population. In this way, we follow Bettinger and Grote (2016, p.
83) by treating variables in the database as outcomes of “appropriate foraging decisions” relative to the local ecology and available
resources. While this assumption cannot be tested with the current
data, we defer to cases where it has been tested, such as among Bari
where the optimal number of individuals in a cooperative ﬁshing
party is the same as the number of co-residing men (Beckerman,
1983), and among Inuit where “… foraging group size is guided
by a desire to maximize per capita returns” (Smith 1991, p. 350),
even when actual cooperative group sizes do not exactly conform to
optimal expectations.
Our predictions suggest that these two measures of group size
should covary with a number of additional attributes. First, we
predict that the degree of resource ownership should increase with
cooperative group size. For this Binford (2001, Table 9.01) provides
an ordinal scale indicating the level of ownership of resource locations (owners) that ranges from one to four. Importantly,
Freeman and Anderies (2015) note that these four categories do not
clearly reﬂect a linearly increasing scale. A value of one indicates no
ownership, values of two or three indicate that local groups claim
resource ownership (resource locations generally vs. hunting and
ﬁshing locations speciﬁcally), and a value of four indicates elite
ownership and some form of inheritance. As such, levels two and
three may be considered equal, though we keep them distinct here.
Second, we predict that intergroup violence should increase
with group size. Johnson (2014) reports an ordinal estimate of the
scale of intergroup conﬂict (gpgpcon), which varies from one to
four. The range of variation in intergroup violence includes: 1) none
reported, 2) revenge raiding, 3) accelerative raiding, and 4) accelerative conﬂicts of annihilation.
Third, we predict that populations with larger cooperative
groups should have higher levels of warfare. To evaluate this we use

the variable on the scale and intensity of warfare (war1), which
varies from one to ﬁve including: 1) no organized competition, 2)
conﬂict is present off and on, 3) conﬂict is off and on more than
category 2 and includes unprovoked attacks on intruders, 4) conﬂict is common with signiﬁcant ﬂare ups, to 5) conﬂict is sustained
with the goal of long-term expansion (Johnson, 2014). While
intergroup violence and warfare overlap, the later captures more
formal and organized forms of violence.
Additionally, because the shape of the utility function (i.e., how
the beneﬁts-costs vary with group size) outlined in the proposed
predictions may vary due to differences in the economy of scale
associated with different forms of subsistence, we examine subsets
of all the data based on whether the dominant source of food
(subsp) comes from terrestrial plants (“Gathering”), terrestrial animals (“Hunting”), or aquatic resources (“Aquatics”). Out of the 157
total in our sample, 60 are focused on gathering terrestrial plants,
38 are focused on hunting terrestrial animals, and 59 are focused on
aquatic resources.
Finally, one problem that requires attention is the possible nonindependence of variables derived from related populations.
Known as Galton's Problem (Tylor, 1889), non-independence could
bias the results if a number of individual cases have similar values
as a result of historical transmission from a common source, which
could lead a historical cause to be conﬂated for functional cause. We
account for this statistically (see below) using the phylogenetic
language classiﬁcation (phyl) (Johnson, 2014) derived from Ethnologue (Lewis et al., 2009), tagging each case by its most generic
linguistic phylum, often referred to as the language family. The data
include 17 language families: Algic, Chimakuan, Chumash, Coahuiltecan, Eskimo-aleut, Guacurian, Hokan, Kiowa Tanoan, Kutenai,
Na-dene, Oto-manguean, Penutian, Salishan, Siouan, Uto-aztecan,
Wakashan, and Yuki. All of these variables are summarized in
Table 1.
2.2. Statistical methods
To evaluate the predictions outlined above, we rely on generalized additive models (Wood, 2006). Just as generalized linear
models extend ordinary least squares regression to data with nonnormally distributed errors (Faraway, 2006), generalized additive
models extend linear models further by allowing for a non-linear
response between predictor and response variables. Because
these models do not force a functional relationship between variable sets, they allow the data to “speak for themselves”.
Analyses are run in the R environment (R Core Team, 2016) using
the mgcv library (Wood, 2012). Models assume a poisson distribution based on the count (e.g., number of people) or count-like
(e.g., ordinal levels of ownership) nature of the variables, and rely
on quasi-likelihood estimation to avoid over dispersion.

To account for the problem of non-independence (i.e., Galton's
Problem), we use generalized additive mixed models (GAMM) and
include the language phylogeny as a random effect. This allows us
to evaluate the results while removing the potential effect of historical relatedness (see, e.g., Currie and Mace, 2009; Nettle, 2009).
All model results report the sample size (n), the estimated degrees of freedom (edf), the f-statistic (f), the r2 value, and the p
value. Interpretation of the results rely on an examination of the
amount of variance in the response variable explained by the predictor variable (r 2 ) and the probability that the relationship is a
false positive (p value).
3. Results
3.1. Question 1: are larger cooperative groups more likely to own
resource locations?
The scale of resource ownership initially increases signiﬁcantly
with the minimum cooperative group size (r 2 ¼ 0.13, p ¼ 0.0026)
and the aggregated cooperative group size (r 2 ¼ 0.11, p ¼ 0.0003;
see Table 2), however both of these relationships are non-linear
(Fig. 3). Ownership increases with the minimum cooperative
group up to approximately 35 individuals, and begins to decline
after about 40 individuals. This decline is driven by several populations of horse mounted hunters (e.g., Blackfoot, Assiniboin,
Crow) who have large groups, but limited ownership of resource
patches. Resource ownership increases with the aggregated
cooperative group size, leveling off after approximately 400 individuals. This suggests that there is a diminishing return to
ownership as a function of group size. These trends hold when
language family is included as a random effect (Table 2), showing
that the results are not biased by the non-independent history of
related populations.
Examining each subsistence category independently reveals no
meaningful relationship between group size and ownership among
hunting-oriented populations, while both gathering- and aquaticoriented populations reveal strong positive associations between
group size an ownership (Table 2).
Among the subset of gathering populations, Owens Valley
Paiute have the largest minimum cooperative group size and,
along with California societies such as Nomlaki and Lake Miwok,
maintain the highest level of ownership (3) present in this subsample. These populations all share an intensive focus on tree
nuts (pine nuts or acorns), which likely have an economy of scale.
Likewise, Mono (or Monachi), an intensive acorn gathering population in the Sierra Nevada, have the largest aggregated cooperative group size and highest level of ownership (4), followed by
other intensive acorn economies such as the Serrano and Diegueno, and by the pine nut-reliant Owens Valley Paiute in the

Table 1
Summary of variables.
Variable

Description

Role

Type

Minimum cooperative
group size (group1)

smallest self-sufﬁcient group that regularly
cooperates for subsistence during
the most dispersed time of the year
average consumer group size during
the most aggregated time of year
ownership of resource locations

predictor

count

predictor

count

response

ordinal (1e4)

scale of intergroup violence

response

ordinal (1e4)

scale and intensity of warfare
dominant source of food
language phylogenetic classiﬁcation

response
covariate
covariate

ordinal (1e5)
categorical
categorical

Aggregated cooperative
group size (group 2)
Resource ownership
(owners)
Intergroup violence
(gpgpcon)
Warfare (war1)
Subsistence (subsp1)
Phylogeny (phyl)

Table 2
Summary of generalized additive model results testing each of the three predictions.
P#) Variable

P1)
P1)
P1)
P1)
P1)
P2)
P2)
P2)
P2)
P2)
P3)
P3)
P3)
P3)
P3)
a

Minimum Cooperative Group

Resource Ownership
Resource Ownershipa
Ownership: Hunting
Ownership: Gathering
Ownership: Aquatics
Intergroup Violence
Intergroup Violencea
Violence: Hunting
Violence: Gathering
Violence: Aquatics
Warfare
Warfarea
Warfare: Hunting
Warfare: Gathering
Warfare: Aquatics

Aggregated Cooperative Group

n

edf

f

r2

p

n

edf

f

r2

p

77
77
30
35
12
77
77
30
35
12
77
77
30
35
12

1.9
1.72
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.9
1.84
1.8
1.0
1.0
1.9
1.80
1.8
1.0
1.0

7.08
5.42
1.66
7.55
9.44
26.36
14.83
11.36
4.80
<0.01
20.59
13.89
14.66
10.20
0.12

0.13
0.09
0.02
0.17
0.48
0.43
0.419
0.46
0.11
<0.01
0.34
0.33
0.49
0.21
<0.01

0.0026
0.0395
0.2080
0.0096
0.0114
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0004
0.0354
0.9370
<0.0001
0.0001
<0.0001
0.0030
0.7390

138
138
34
53
51
138
138
34
53
51
138
138
34
53
51

1.7
1.57
1.0
1.0
1.8
1.9
1.86
1.8
1.9
1.4
1.9
1.84
1.0
1.8
1.8

10.47
9.25
2.07
13.87
5.16
30.16
16.34
9.73
13.78
8.59
28.45
20.15
30.61
10.49
9.44

0.11
0.10
0.03
0.20
0.15
0.30
0.28
0.37
0.35
0.19
0.28
0.28
0.51
0.28
0.24

0.0003
0.0042
0.1600
0.0005
0.0177
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0010
<0.0001
0.0040
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0004
0.0009

Model controls for linguistic relatedness (language family) as a random effect.

Great Basin.
The strongest association between group size and ownership is
among the subset of aquatic foragers, with whom 48% of the variance in resource ownership is explained by the minimum cooperative group (Table 2). The three largest aggregated cooperative
groups with the highest level of ownership (see Fig. 3, right frame,
top right of plot) are all from the Northwest Coast: Haida, Kwakiutl,
and Tsimshim. Two other aquatic focused populations, the Haisla
and Chumash, have equally large or larger aggregated groups with
the next highest scale of resource ownership indicating owned
hunting or ﬁshing grounds.

minimum cooperative group size is driven by hunting focused
populations, for which the relationship holds strong when examined alone (r 2 ¼ 0.46, p < 0.0001). The relationship also holds with
gathering focused groups (r2 ¼ 0.11, p ¼ 0.0354), but the minimum
cooperative group size does not explain variation in violence
among aquatic focused populations (r2 < 0.01, p ¼ 0.9370).
The scale of intergroup violence increases signiﬁcantly with the
aggregated cooperative group size among all subsistence groups
independently (Table 2). Aggregated group size accounts for 37%,
35% and 19% of the variance in ordinal violence among hunting,
gathering, and aquatic oriented foragers respectively. Among
gathering populations, California societies have the highest
conﬂict-group size combinations, including the Serrano, Diegueno,
and Southern Pomo. Overall, Northwest Coast populations focused
on aquatic resources such as the Haisla and Haida have the largest
aggregated cooperative group sizes, and the highest levels of
intergroup violence.

3.2. Question 2: do larger cooperative groups have higher levels of
inter-group violence?

3.3. Question 3: do larger cooperative groups have higher levels of
warfare?

5

The scale and intensity of warfare increases signiﬁcantly with
the minimum cooperative group size (r2 ¼ 0.34, p < 0.0001) and the
aggregated cooperative group size (r 2 ¼ 0.28, p < 0.0001),

Aquatics
Gathering
Hunting

1

2

2

3

3

4

4

Aquatics
Gathering
Hunting

1

Ownership of Resource Locations

5

Larger cooperative groups tend to have increased levels of
intergroup violence (Table 2). The scale of intergroup violence increases signiﬁcantly with the minimum cooperative group size up
to approximately 45 individuals (r 2 ¼ 0.43, p < 0.0001), and with
the aggregated cooperative group up to approximately 350 individuals (r 2 ¼ 0.30, p < 0.0001), plateauing thereafter in both cases
(Fig. 4). As with resource ownership, these trends hold when
controlling for phylogenetic relatedness (Table 2).
Much of the variation in intergroup violence explained by the
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Fig. 3. Ownership of resource locations as a function of the minimum cooperative group size (left) and aggregated cooperative group size (right). Overall results conﬁrm the
prediction that larger corporate groups have higher levels of resource ownership.
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Fig. 4. Scale of intergroup violence as a function of the minimum cooperative group size (left) and aggregated cooperative group size (right). Overall results support the prediction
that larger corporate groups have greater levels of violence.

group size combinations overall.
4. Discussion
4.1. Summary of results

5

Overall, the results uphold our predictions indicating positive
covariance between cooperative group size and territorial behaviors. Given our theoretical assumptions, we suggest these relationships result from Western North American foragers engaging
in subsistence strategies with economies of scale that created Alleelike relationships between utility and population size. While this
relationship itself cannot be tested with these data, the results are
consistent with our expectations and suggest areas for future
research.
However, despite the overall support of our predictions, there is
variation across subsistence types that illustrates a nuanced relationship between cooperative group size and territorial behavior.
The results indicate that increased cooperative group size leads to
greater resource ownership only among gathering and aquatic
focused foragers, but not among hunting focused foragers. This
likely results from the high residential mobility of hunting groups,
itself driven by the dense yet unpredictable nature of their resource
base, which as Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978) illustrate,
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plateauing at approximately 45 individuals and 400 individuals
respectively (Fig. 5). These trends remain robust even when accounting for shared linguistic ancestry (Table 2).
The relationship between the minimum cooperative group size
and warfare holds for hunting (r 2 ¼ 0.49, p < 0.0001) and gathering
(r2 ¼ 0.21, p ¼ 0.0030) focused populations, but not for populations
relying on aquatic resources (r 2 < 0.01, p ¼ 0.7390). Of gatheringfocused populations, those with the highest levels of warfare
have economies focused on tree nuts, such as the Lake Miwok and
Owens Valley Paiute. Overall, the largest minimum cooperative
groups with the most warfare are all horse-mounted hunting
populations including the Blackfoot, Crow, and Comanche.
The signiﬁcant effect of the aggregate cooperative group size on
the scale and intensity of warfare holds for all subsistence categories (Table 2), explaining as much as 51% of the variance for
hunting populations and as little as 24% for aquatic oriented populations. The hunting-focused populations with large aggregated
groups and high levels of warfare are all horse mounted hunters,
including the Arapaho, Blackfoot, Crow, and Kiowa. Plant gathering
populations with large aggregated cooperative groups and high
levels of warfare again include tree nut (acorn) focused populations
such as the Serrano, Monachi, and Southern Pomo. Aquatic-focused
populations on the Northwest Coast, including the Haida, Tsimshim, Kwakiutl, and Haisla, have the highest warfareeaggregate
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Fig. 5. Scale and intensity of warfare as a function of the minimum cooperative group size (left) and aggregated cooperative group size (right). Overall results support the prediction
that larger corporate groups have greater levels widespread regional conﬂict.

precludes economic defendability.
While violence and warfare increase with the minimum cooperative group size among hunting and gathering populations, the
relationship does not hold among aquatic focused populations. This
may result from the limited number of aquatic groups for which
minimum cooperative group size estimates are available, itself
perhaps a telling indicator that the measure has little meaning with
sedentary or semi-sedentary populations like those on the Northwest Coast who live in densely aggregated groups year round due
to the dense and predictable nature of their resource base (DysonHudson and Smith, 1978).
The low extreme combinations of group size and territorial
behavior are dominated by terrestrial plant gathering populations.
But it is important to note that each of the predicted relationships
between group size and territorial behavior holds when examined
among terrestrial plant gatherers independently. This indicates that
variation in territorial behavior, even among populations focused
on terrestrial plants, may be driven by increasing economies of
scale that lead to Allee-like dynamics. With plants, such economies
of scale are likely motivated either by capital investments (such as
burning, or sowing seeds, Freeman and Baggio, 2017, this issue), by
improving efﬁciency in collecting resources over a short harvest
window (Morgan, 2012), or by technological innovations that
reduce processing time (Hawkes and O'Connell, 1992). In the current sample, these trends seem most apparent with tree nut
economies.
The high extreme combinations are represented by highly mobile horse-mounted hunting populations for the minimum cooperative group size, and by sedentary Northwest Coast aquatic
focused populations for the aggregate cooperative group size. That
horse mounted groups have the largest minimum cooperative
groups suggests that the adoption of the horse brings an economy
of scale that necessitates coordinated hunting. That aquatic focused
populations have the largest aggregated cooperative groups suggests that there are limited beneﬁts of ﬁssioning in order to exploit
more dispersed resources.
While the results may be driven by other trade-offs experienced
by Western North American hunter-gatherer populations, we
suggest these ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical
assumption that Allee-like economies of scale drive the formation
of larger cooperative groups who ﬁnd territorial behaviors
worthwhile.
4.2. Individuals, groups, free riders and defenders
The IDM examined here has the beneﬁt of generating testable
predictions about how individuals should respond to speciﬁc contexts, and how those decisions will look in aggregate (Sutherland,
1996). Importantly, rather than thinking that larger cooperative
groups have more resource ownership, violence, and warfare
simply because they can, here we suggest that these institutions
and strategies emerge not only from the ability of larger groups, but
from individual self interest that is more or less aligned at or near
optimal cooperative group size (Fig. 1d). This also shows that no
appeal to the problematic (see Williams, 1966) theory of group
selection is necessary to account for these patterns (cf. Bowles,
2009).
However, it would be unrealistic to think that the interests of
individuals would be completely aligned so to overcome the social
dilemma present in territorial defense. Individuals who pay the
cost of defense provide a beneﬁt that is shared among everyone. If
too few people are willing to pay those costs, then the burden of
defense will be too great and territorial behaviors will collapse, or
never emerge in the ﬁrst place. Hence why some suggest that
collective behaviors require punishment (e.g., Mathew and Boyd,

2011) to ensure enough of the population pays the cost for the
collective good. But punishment is itself a second-order collective
action problem that necessitates some differential beneﬁt to the
punisher (e.g., Fehr and G€
achter, 2002). Hence why we suggest that
defenders must either pay lower costs, or must receive additional
beneﬁts. For example, some individuals may be inherently better at
excluding others so that they incur only a fraction of the costs
compared to the average person. Individual defenders may also
gain differential beneﬁts from their pro-social behavior (Smith and
Bliege Bird, 2005), possibly emerging as leaders who coordinate
defense (Glowacki and von Rueden, 2015) or reprisals (Glowacki
et al., 2016) and gain material rewards or social position as a
result. Further, the contribution of a few may elicit more contributions from others leading to a higher proportion of defenders
(McAuliffe et al., 2015). Though no matter how low the cost or high
the rewards, we expect that some proportion of the population will
always free ride, but as long as they are few enough that those
paying the costs of territorial defense do a bit better through their
collective efforts, then those free riders should be tolerated (Blurton
Jones, 1984, 1987). With these dynamics in mind, we suggest that
the model presented here illustrates the conditions that create just
enough of an alignment in self interest to raise the proportion of
defenders above some threshold that makes cooperative defense
worthwhile.
4.3. Intensiﬁcation, economies of scale, and property rights
Our ﬁndings support the idea that there is a link between
cooperative group size and territorial behaviors, which we suggest
is driven by Allee-like economies of scale. But these ﬁndings also
raise the question of what produces an economy of scale in the ﬁrst
place. One possible explanation is that economic intensiﬁcation
(sensu stricto, see Morgan, 2015) may underlie the emergence of
economic activities that scale with additional labor inputs. Intensive economies are those that yield higher returns per unit area, but
at a higher overall cost (Boserup, 1965). From the perspective of
optimal foraging theory, speciﬁcally the prey choice model
(Charnov, 1976), intensiﬁcation results from a decline in the
encounter rate with high return resources, to which individuals
optimally respond by widening their diet breadth to include lower
ranked resources that require greater amounts of time spent in
pursuit and/or processing (see examples in Bird and O'Connell,
2006; Codding and Bird, 2015). Because such resources are often
abundant, but require increased handling time, individuals will
beneﬁt from anything that increases pursuit or processing efﬁciency (Hawkes and O'Connell, 1992), including any form of cooperation that increases per capita gains.
Cooperative labor may be particularly important if the availability of these intensive resources is seasonally synchronous, such
as anadromous ﬁsh or tree nuts, which require individuals to capture, and possibly process, large amounts of food over a relatively
short period of time in order to store enough for other parts of the
year. Several events in Western North American prehistory seem to
support this hypothesis, including the transition to intensive
salmon economies on the Northwest Coast of California
(Tushingham and Bettinger, 2013, 2017, this issue), the emergence
of acorn economies throughout California (Gifford, 1936; McCarthy,
1993; Codding and Jones, 2016; Stevens et al., 2017, this issue) and
the shift to intensive green cone pine nut processing in the Great
Basin (Bettinger and Baumhoff, 1982; Magargal et al., 2017). Each of
these subsistence transitions represent an economic shift toward a
more intensive resource that may have an economy of scale, and
results in increased territorial behavior. If Allee effects are the
driver of these patterns, then the optimal size of a cooperative
group and the scale of territorial behaviors may be predictable

based on the ecological conditions that structure the local economy
of scale. In the Great Basin, such differences are seen comparing
Shoshone, who operated in smaller cooperative groups over
smaller territories and had family level ownership of grass seed
locations, with the Northern Paiute, who operated in larger cooperative groups over larger territories and had band level ownership
of pine nut tracts (Parker et al., 2017, this issue).
While previous work suggests that property rights and intensive
economies necessarily co-evolve (Bowles and Choi, 2013; Freeman
and Baggio, 2017, this issue), here we offer the intermediate step
that such intensive economies may facilitate the emergence of
territorial behavior if they provide an Allee-like economy of scale. If
this is generally true, then where intensive economic shifts occur,
we should expect to see individuals close the commons (sensu
Ostrom, 1990) at a size and scale proportional to the optimal
cooperative group size generated by the particular economy of
scale.
4.4. Violence, warfare and territoriality
Violence was common across North America, but with signiﬁcant variation between populations (Lambert, 2002; Chacon and
Mendoza, 2007; Allen and Jones, 2014; Allen et al., 2016). The
ﬁndings outlined above suggest that this variation in the frequency
and scope of intergroup aggression may result at least in part from
the size of the optimal cooperative group, which itself may be
driven by Allee effects that produce an economy of scale and
facilitate in-group cooperation to exclude others.
Our interpretation is in line with long-standing anthropological
theories that see intergroup violence as an adaptive response to
particular ecological circumstances, such as increasing competition
for scarce resources (Durham, 1976). Here, however, we extend this
model of violence to suggest that just as property rights may coevolve with intensive economies of scale, so may intergroup
aggression grow with Allee-like beneﬁts to cooperation. If this is
true, then factors that precipitate violence, such as resource scarcity
(Allen et al., 2016), may have a greater effect when populations are
engaged in the exploitation of intensive resources that facilitate
cooperative economic endeavors.
The archaeological record for North America provides some
support for this conclusion. For example, Moss and Erlandson
(1992) suggest that the proliferation of defensive sites approximately 1000 years ago in the North Paciﬁc may be associated with
increased resource stress among a relatively large population
focused on intensive ﬁshing, making it critical to exclude others.
Despite lacking clear defensive structures (Lambert, 2002) the
prehistoric record in California also provides examples where
variation in violence seems to be linked to territoriality (Bartelink
et al., 2013; Lambert, 1997; Schwitalla et al., 2014). Of note, osteological evidence of violence the Santa Barbara Channel region is
associated with an increase in population size, ﬁshing intensity,
climate change, and territorial formation (Walker, 1989; Lambert,
1997, 2002; Kennett and Kennett, 2000; Kennett et al., 2009;
Jazwa et al., 2017, this issue), again suggesting a link between
Allee-like economies and competition that may drive exclusionary
behavior at or beyond the optimal group size.
Ethnographic data too offer some support for this framework.
Tushingham and Bettinger (2017, this issue) show that Northwest
Coast populations reliant on intensive “front loaded” resources
requiring up front processing have larger cooperative groups
operating at higher densities producing expansive territorial
behavior. In California, Bettinger (2015) argues that smaller, but
more cohesive cooperative groups known as “Tribelets” (Kroeber,
1925, 1955) formed through a process of intensiﬁcation focused
on acorns, and later small seeds, encouraging kin-based territorial

ownership over plant resource patches.
4.5. Conditions for despotism?
This paper proposes that Allee-like effects generate an economy
of scale which may establish the foundations for overcoming the
within-group collective action problems associated with limiting
group size, which also promotes between-group boundary formation possibly leading to conﬂict. As such, this framework outlines
the conditions wherein egalitarian populations who are “free” to
settle where they like, may become constrained by others who have
an interest in limiting group size. While this transition to a
“despotic” settlement pattern has been used to explain the origins
of social inequality (e.g., Winterhalder et al., 2010; Prufer et al.,
2017; Jazwa et al., 2017, this issue), here, we propose that Alleelike economies of scale may provide a mechanism that facilitates
this transition.
As discussed above, individuals who are able to successfully
limit group size may emerge as leaders who gain differential beneﬁts. If the beneﬁts grant leaders with greater resource holding
potential (Boone, 1992) or favorable reproductive skew
(Vehrencamp, 1983; Summers, 2005), then they may gain sustained
dominance over others. This may further lead to persistent institutionalized inequality if resource patches are defensible and
inherited (Mattison et al., 2016). This situates our framework
within existing models for the origins of inequality, providing a link
connecting processes of economic intensiﬁcation to social
inequality. If this is true, then the emergence of Allee-like economies of scale may inadvertently generate the foundations that
allow despotic behavior to emerge, leading to inequality.
5. Conclusion
Here we suggest that Allee's principle helps to explain how
territorial behaviors can emerge as artifacts of the individual beneﬁts gained from aggregations in ecological contexts where economic returns to scale make in-group cooperation and out-group
exclusion worthwhile. As our results only evaluate the relationship
between group size and territorial behaviors, additional ethnographic work is needed to conﬁrm our theoretical assumptions
linking Allee-like economies of scale and larger optimal group size.
Nonetheless, the results presented here offer an ethnographic
validation of what we argue are the consequences of this general
model of human behavior, speciﬁcally showing that cooperative
group size and territorial behaviors positively covary. We hope this
encourages future work on the topic, including archaeological
evaluations of this model to determine how the linkages between
intensive Allee-like economies of scale and territoriality developed
in the past.
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